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Economic Notes
The New Monetarists
Well, it’s official. Recently, President 
Carter took breath from his other crises and 
announced that the United States had 
entered a period of recession. “The Wolf Has 
Arrived” , Time headlined, but reassured us 
that it was “better late than never” . This 
curious judgment is based on the belief that 
the recession, like a crisis in a long, wasting 
disease, is a Good Thing. It should have come 
a year ago, Time argues, but was delayed by 
a “ bad case of inflationary psychology” .
For months, consumers (Yes! It’s their 
fault again!) have been rushing out to buy in 
the belief that prices, no matter how high 
already, could only go higher. “This has 
ballooned inflation to an annual rate of more 
than 18 per cent” , Time regrets. It also had 
the effect — though here the news magazine 
is silent — of keeping the economy afloat.
It was only in the middle of March that 
someone “pulled the plug on the economy” . 
That someone, Time tells us, was Paul A. 
Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
System. Volcker has long been arguing for a 
deliberately induced recession as the only 
way of beating inflation. He wholeheartedly 
accepts the proposition that the present
combination of economic stagnation and 
rising prices can only be dealt with by 
defeating inflation first.
Volcker, like most political leaders and 
economic gurus in the advanced capitalist 
world, believes the way to do this is to control 
the money supply. Once the money supply is 
reined in, the argument goes, inflation will 
fall and we will have achieved the necessary 
condition for economic recovery. This 
doctrine — or at least its recent revival — 
owes much to Professor Milton Friedman; so 
much so, that Friedman has become the chief 
economic influence on such figures as Chile’s 
General Pinochet, Britain’s Mrs Thatcher, 
our own Mr Fraser, and even Hollywood’s Mr 
Reagan.
Thus, it is probably worth looking a little 
more closely at just what the new 
monetarists argue and what evidence there 
is for their position. This task takes on even 
more importance when we note that it is not 
just conservative politicians and economists 
who have fallen under the monetarist spell. 
In Britain, for example, it was the last 
Labour government that handed over 
economic policy making to the monetarists,
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or at least this is the argument of three 
Labour Party economists writing in a recent 
Fabian Tract on The Politics of Monetarism, 
“The most significant development in 
economic policy over the last two or three 
years has been the conversion of almost 
everyone concerned with the management of 
the British economy to the doctrines of 
monetarism” , the three authors say.
“This development has had the full 
support of the financial establishment and of 
the Conservative Party, as well as that o f  
most o f  the leading figures o f  the last 
Labour Government.”  Thatcher’s victory 
has not, therefore, meant any vital change in 
direction, they argue. The monetarist 
consensus simply continues to prevail.
The same thing is likely to occur in 
Australia. Any future Labor government 
here would no doubt face this same sort of 
consensus in Treasury and throughout the 
public service, among academic economists 
and among those “ experts” paid directly to
put the views of the owners and controllers of 
our economy. One purpose of taking issue 
with the monetarist consensus here and now 
is to make it harder for the Australian Labor 
Party to be captured in the same way its 
British counterpart was.
Since Professor Friedman has been selling 
this consensus so successfully over the last 
few years (even converting the five 
economists of the Nobel Prize Committee of 
the Swedish Academy of Science, who 
awarded him the 1976 Nobel Prize in 
Economics) we may as well start by looking 
at his version of the theory.
From the Horse’s Mouth
“ In its most rigid and unqualified form the 
quantity theory asserts strict proportionality 
between the quantity of what is regarded as 
money and the level of prices,” Friedman 
writes. “ Hardly anyone has held the theory 
in that form, although statements capable of 
being so interpreted have often been made in 
the heat of argument or for expository 
simplicity.”
“Virtually every quantity theorist has 
recognised that changes in the quantity of 
money that correspond to changes in the 
volume of trade or of output have no
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tendency to produce changes in prices. 
Nearly as many have recognised also that 
changes in the willingness of the community 
to hold money can occur for a variety of 
reasonsand can introduce disparities 
between changes in the quantity of money 
per unit of trade or of output and changes in 
prices..”
These two “modifications” to the most 
“rigid and unqualified”  version of the 
quantity theory of money can be illustrated 
in the theory’s famous equation. If we let P be 
the price level and Y be the total output of the 
economy measured in “real” terms, then PY 
is the money value of the output of the 
economy. This, in turn, is equal to the money 
supply, M, multiplied by the number of times, 
on average, the money supply is “ turned 
over” in a given year to buy or sell this 
national output. If we call this last number V, 
the “velocity of circulation” of money, the 
quantity theory equation becomes:
PY = MV
Thus, if the money supply, M, expands by 
five per cent, the price level P must also go up 
by five per cent, unless the level of real 
output, Y, increases. Only if the increase in 
the money supply exactly matches an 
increase in output will prices be stable — 
assuming all the time that the “ velocity 
o f  circulation”  o f  money does not 
change. We will come back to this last point, 
but let’s first note what Friedman thinks 
these “modifications” amount to:
“ What quantity theorists have held in 
com m on is the b e lie f that these 
qualifications (that is: changes in the 
quantity of money corresponding to changes 
in output or changes in the “willingness or 
the community to hold money”) are of 
secondary importance for substantial 
changes in either prices or the quantity of 
money, so that the one will not in fact occur 
without the other..”
The policy implications follow directly. 
“Acceptance of the quantity theory clearly 
means that the stock of money is a key 
variable in policies directed at the control of 
the level of prices or of money income. 
Inflation can be prevented if and only if the 
stock of money per unit of output can be kept 
from increasing appreciably.”
We ignore this simple prescription at our 
peril: “ Monetary authorities have more
frequently than not taken conditions in the 
credit market — rates of interest, availability 
of loans, and so on — as criteria of policy and 
have paid little or no attention to the stock of 
money per se.”
“This emphasis on credit as opposed to 
monetary policy accounts both for the great 
depression in the United States from 1929 to 
1933, when the Federal Reserve System 
allowed the stock of money to decline by one- 
third, and for many of the post-Second World 
War inflations.” If only we had watched the 
money supply, Friedman is saying, both the 
Great D epression and the current 
inflationary crisis could have been avoided.
T oo Good To Be True
It all seems to good a tool to be true. But 
unfortunately, in the real world, there is no 
such simple link between the money supply 
and inflation, though in this matter, as in so 
many others, it is much easier to become 
famous by peddling an easily understood 
and plausible view that happens to be wrong, 
than by giving true insight into a complex, 
contradictory and fundamentally irrational 
system.
The difficulties start back with the 
quantity equation:
PY = MV,
or at least with two of the four terms. 
Unfortunately for the monetarists, they find 
it very hard to say anything certain about 
the two “monetary”  notions in this equation: 
the “money supply” itself, and the “velocity 
of circulation" of money. Let’s take them in 
turn, and see what some of the problems are.
First, the more straightforward of the two: 
the “velocity of circulation” of the existing 
money supply. O f the four variables in their 
equation, this is the one the monetarists have 
least to say about, preferring everyone else to 
forget that it is there. The reason is dear. For 
their theory to hold, the “velocity of 
circulation” of money has to be more or less 
constant. If the money supply is held down, 
but that money supply is “turned over” more 
rapidly, it is still possible for inflation to take 
place. Alternatively, an increase in the 
money supply might not translate into 
higher prices if the velocity of circulation 
falls at the same time.
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In practice, all sorts of combinations are 
possible. Thus, in Britain, between the first 
quarter of 1971 and the first quarter of 1974, 
the velocity fell q uarter by quarter from 3.111 
times to 2.345 times as the supply of money 
was increased. When the Labour 
government came to office and the increase 
in the money supply slowed down, the 
velocity of circulation increased quarter by 
quarter to 3.094 times in the third quarter of
1977.
In other words, the velocity of circulation 
of the money supply changed in such a way 
as to make up for changes in the money 
supply itself. Something else, apart from the 
factors the monetarists consider, must be at 
work. This “something else” was recognised 
as long ago as 1810, in a famous report of a 
Select Committee of the House of Commons 
on The High Price of Bullion:
That committee pointed out that “ the mere 
numerical return of the amount of bank notes 
in circulation cannot be considered as at all 
deciding the question whether such paper is 
or is not excessive.... the quantity of currency 
bears no fixed relation to the quantity of 
commodities .... and any inferences 
proceeding on such a supposition would be 
entirely erroneous.”
The committee concluded that: “the 
effective currency of a country depends on 
the quickness of circulation .... as well as the 
numerical amount” and that “all the 
circumstances which have a tendency to 
quicken or retard the rate of circulation 
render the same amount of currency more or 
less adequate to the wants of trade.”
If it is the “wants of trade” that really 
matter, and the velocity of circulation of 
money merely adapts to this, there is little 
left of the monetarist position. But this point, 
recognised so long ago, is not the only one 
that leads to problems for the quantity 
theory.
The other term in their equation that the 
monetarists have difficulty with is M itself: 
the money supply. Everyone knows there are 
different “definitions” of money which 
include or exclude different sorts of financial 
assets as money, ranging from a narrow 
definition which includes only cash and 
bank deposits, to wider ones which include 
progressively less “liquid” assets. Now the 
question of which definition to use might 
seem just a technical one, and has been
treated this way by the monetarists. 
However, it is not the technical difficulties 
the monetarists face that we want to 
highlight; rather it is the fact that any 
attempt to control the money supply under 
one particular definition, in violation of the 
“wants of trade” , will make that definition 
irrelevant.
Nicholas Kaldor, in his critique o f 
Friedman, has made this point well using a 
parable: “Every schoolboy (and, we would 
presume, every schoolgirl — T.O’S) knows 
that cash in the hands of the public regularly 
shoots up at Christmas, goes down in 
January and shoots up again around the 
summer bank holiday.”
Kaldor acknowledges that nobody, not 
even Friedman, would suggest that the 
December increase in note circulation is the 
cause of the Christmas buying spree. “ But,” 
he asks, “there is the question that is more 
relevent to the Friedman thesis: could the 
‘authorities’ prevent the buying spree by 
refusing to supply additional notes and coins 
in the Christmas season?”
How could this be done? One way, Kaldor 
suggests, would be by instructing the banks, 
for example, not to cash more than £5 at any 
one time for each customer and to keep down 
the number of cashiers, so as to maintain 
reasonably long queues in frontof each bank 
window. “If a man (sic) needed to queue up 
ten times a day, half an hour at a time, to get 
£50 in notes, this would impose a pretty 
effective constraint on the cash supply,”  he 
concludes.
But would it stop Christmas buying? 
Naturally there would be chaos for a few 
days, but soon all kinds of money substitutes 
would spring up: there would be a rush to join 
the Diners’ Club and everyone who could be 
“trusted” would get things on “credit” . Those 
who are not so “ trusted” — Kaldor suggests 
this applies to the mass of the working class
— would be paid in chits issued instead of 
cash by, say, the top five hundred businesses 
in the country (who would also, for a 
commission, provide such chits to other 
employers).
These five hundred firms would soon find 
it convenient to set up a clearing system of 
their own, by investing in a giant computer 
which would at regular intervals cancel out 
all mutual claims and liabilities. Once this
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had happened there would be a complete 
alternative money system, side by side with 
“official money” .
What, at any time, is regarded as “money” 
are those forms of financial claims that are 
commonly used to clear debts. But, Kaldor 
points out, any shortage of commonly used 
types is bound to lead to the emergence of 
new types. (This is how, historically, first 
bank notes and then cheque accounts 
emerged.)
Thus the difficulties the monetarists have 
in “ defining” the money supply is not 
accidental; and, what is more, the more 
successfully they try to control it, the harder 
they will find it is to define it.
The Theory in Action
Despite these theoretical difficulties, and 
despite the fact that they have had no 
success so far in defeating inflation, 
monetarists around the world continue to 
preach their doctrine o f putting a clamp on 
any economy that shows any life.
Americans will feel the cost more and more 
this year and next, unless Carter, in a fit of 
pre-election nerves, modifies aspects of his 
monetarist advisers’ economic package. At 
least for Americans — and this perhaps 
applies for us in Australia — election 
timetables might serve to delay the worst 
aspects of the monetarist freeze. The British, 
however, have no such luck. They’ve had 
their election, and now they’re paying.
This was spelt out by Britain’s Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Sir Godfrey Howe, when he 
presented the Conservative government’s 
second Budget last month. The 1980*81 
Budget is unmistakably deflationary. 
Output is expected to drop 2.5 per cent this 
year. Unemployment will increase, as will 
inflation. Real incomes and demand are 
forecast to fall. Recovery is not forecast till 
1984, which just happens to be when the next 
election is scheduled.
The Budget called for more cuts in 
government spending, hitting particularly 
education, the financing of nationalised 
industries and social security, but covering 
virtually every other area. The exceptions 
are interesting: defence spending is to 
increase by three per cent in real terms this 
year, and expenditure on law and order by
two per cent. The aim is to reduce the deficit 
from £9 billion to f 8.5 billion, and to continue 
the process over the next four years so that 
the money supply will then be growing at 
only six percent, instead of the present 11 per 
cent.
Somehow, sometime, this is all supposed to 
lead to a fall in the inflation rate and then to 
an economic recovery, but neither Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, nor Mr Volcker in the United 
States, can demonstrate either the “how” or 
the “when” of this connection. They both, 
like their Australian counterparts when 
pressed, fall back on one or other tenet of 
their monetarist faith.
They might do better, though, if they 
looked more closely at the history of their 
faith — or at least they might not do as much 
harm. For it is a remarkable thing that 
Friedman, for all his fame, his Nobel Prize, 
and his access to the great, has discovered 
nothing. All he has done is revive a very old 
theory, in fact, one of the first theories 
developed to explain how capitalism works. 
Over three hundred years ago the English 
philosopher David Hume developed a 
version of monetarism that was, in many 
ways, more sophisticated than Friedman’s. 
It was certainly more humane in its policy 
implications.
Hume, writing in 1752, formulated the 
quantity theory of money this way: “ It seems 
a maxim almost self-evident, that the prices 
of every thing depend on the proportion 
betwixt commodities and money, and that 
any considerable alteration on either of these 
has the same effect either of heightening or 
low ering the prices. Encrease the 
commodities, they become cheaper: encrease 
the money, they rise in their value. As, on the 
other hand, a diminution of the former and 
that of the latter have contrary tendencies.”
We might conclude from this, Hume 
suggests, that an increase in the price level 
following an increase in the amount of 
money circulating (he was thinking of the 
“price revolution” in Europe following the 
importation of silver and gold from the 
Americas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries) would just leave everything the 
same. It might have more effect, either good 
or bad, he says, “ than it would make any 
alteration on a merchant’s books, if instead 
of the Arabian method of notation, which 
requires few characters, he should make use
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of the Roman, which requires a great many. 
Nay, the greater quantity of money, like the 
Roman characters, is rather inconvenient 
and troublesome; and requires greater care to 
keep and transport it. ”
But there is another effect of changes in the 
money supply which Hume was very much 
aware of, but which the modern monetarists 
wish to ignore: “But notwithstanding this 
conclusion ,” he continues, “which must be 
allowed just, ‘tis certain, that since the 
discovery of the mines in America, industry 
has encreas’d in all the nations of Europe, 
except in the possessors of those mines; and 
this may justly be ascrib’d, amongst other 
reasons, to the encrease of gold and silver.”
“ Accordingly we find, that in every 
kingdom, into which money begins to flow in 
greater abundance than formerly, every 
thing takes a new face; labour and industry 
gain life; the merchant becomes more 
enterprizing; the m anufacturer more diligent 
and skillful; and even the farmer follows his 
plough with greater alacrity and attention.”
How can this be, if increasing the money 
supply simply increases the price level? 
Hume has an answer: “To account, then, for 
this phenomenon, we must consider, that 
tho’ the high price of commodities be a 
necessary consequence of the encrease of 
gold and silver, yet it follows not 
immediately upon that encrease; but some 
time is requir’d before the money circulate 
thro’ the whole state, and makes its effects be 
felt on all ranks of people.”
“When any quantity of money is imported 
into a nation, it is not at first disperst into 
many hands, but is confin’d to the coffers of a 
few persons, who immediately seek to 
employ it to the best advantage. Here are a 
set of manufacturers or merchants, we shall 
suppose, who have receiv’d returns of gold 
and silver for goods, which they sent to 
Cadiz. They are thereby enabled to employ 
more workmen than formerly, who never 
dream of demanding higher wages, but are 
glad of employment from such good 
paymasters.”
“ If workm en - becom e scarce,  the 
manufacturer gives higher wages, but at first 
requires an encrease of labour; and this is 
willingly submitted to by the artizan, who 
can now eat and drink better to compensate 
his additional toil and fatigue.”
“ He carries his money to market, where he 
finds every thing at the same price as 
formerly, but returns with greater quantity 
and of better kinds, for the use of his family. 
The farmer and gardner, finding, that all 
their commodities are taken off, apply 
themselves with alacrity to the raising of 
more; and at the same time, can afford to take 
more and better cloths from their tradesmen, 
whose price is the same as formerly, and 
their industry only whetted by so much new 
gain. ‘Tis easy to trace the money on its 
progress thro’ the whole commonwealth; 
where we shall find, that it must first quicken 
the diligence of every individual, before it 
encrease the price of labour.”
It is this effect, on real income, that Hume 
wants to highlight. Since real incomes have 
increased, prices do not go up by as much as 
the increase in money supply. “The prices of 
all things have only risen three, or at most 
four times, since the discovery of the West 
Indies,” Hume notes, but the increase in the 
amount of gold and silver in Europe has been 
much greater than this. The reason? “More 
commodities are produc’d by additional 
industry, the same commodities come more 
to market, after men depart from their 
antient simplicity of manners. And tho’ this 
encrease has not been equal to that of money, 
it has, however, been considerable, and has 
preserv’d the proportion betwixt coin and 
commodities nearer the antient standard.”
Hume explains the case of a shortage of 
money by reversing the argument, and 
paints a picture that is becoming more 
familiar: “A nation whose money decreases, 
is actually much weaker and more miserable 
than another nation, who possesses no more 
money, but is on the encreasing hand. Thq 
workman has not the same employment 
from the manufacturer and merchant; tho’ 
he pays the same price for every thing in die 
market. The fanner cannot dispose of his 
com and cattle; tho’ he must pay the same 
rent to his landlord. The poverty and 
beggary and sloth, which must ensue, are 
easily foreseen.”
Easily foreseen, perhaps by David Hume’s 
readers in 1752, but not by Milton 
Friedman’s in 1980.
— Terry O’Shaughnessy, 
May 4 ,1980 .
